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even to those who remained unconvinced. In this great movement it is imperative that nothing should be said to alienate the sympathy of any Church. The second controversial point with which Mr. Spiller deals is his conviction of the value and vital necessity of direct and systematic moral instruction, and in this connection he replies briefly, and somewhat summarily, to various objections which have been raised against it.

The author is on safer ground when he commences to discuss different schemes for moral instruction. The latter half of the second chapter is by far the most interesting part of the book, and it contains what we regard as its most lasting and valuable contribution to the literature of the subject. After criticising certain schemes already in existence Mr. Spiller outlines a plan for the construction of an ideal syllabus; for this alone the volume would deserve a place in the library of all who are interested in education. His plan is based upon the view, that since the virtues alone are abstract and disconnected, the systematic treatment of the relations of life, in reference to which the virtues become concrete and significant, is the only foundation which meets the needs of the case. He therefore advocates a combination of the syllabuses of the Moral Instruction League with those of the French State Schools, the four cardinal virtues to be systematically applied to the twelve categories or relations of the French plan. The scheme is thus based upon the situations in which a man finds himself and the virtues he should exhibit in them. It is a general ideal but, as such, it seems to be greatly in advance of any scheme at present elaborated in this country. Mr. Spiller very rightly urges that the syllabus in its final form should be the product of many men and should represent interests as various and comprehensive as possible. If the book leads to the construction of such a syllabus, it will have achieved a mighty purpose.

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A PLURALISTIC UNIVERSE. By William James. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909. Pp. 404.

It is a little difficult to give an account of pragmatist ethics from Professor James's "Pluralistic Universe" because in the

course of the book he makes scarcely any definite ethical valuations in the formal style. We find here no elaborate analysis of the word 'good,' no careful distinction between its use with regard to 'means' and its use with regards to 'ends.' "And this is scarcely odd," some one may say, "because the book is really about metaphysics." As a matter of fact, for Professor James the two subjects are not exclusive. His metaphysics are so full of ethical feeling that for him to write on the one subject without implicitly dealing with the other is almost unthinkable. And just in this point lies the main difference between Professor James and other pragmatists on the one hand, and those realists who still cling to intellectualism, on the other.

The ethics of Mr. G. E. Moore, for instance, are beautifully clear and simple, and partly at least for this reason, that they stand eternally unrelated and incapable of relation to any metaphysical beliefs which their author may hold. Neither can metaphysics alter them nor they alter metaphysics. This predominantly intellectual analysis of the whole question of ethics serves admirably to illustrate Professor James's point about the 'usefulness' (relative truth) as opposed to the 'truth' (absolute) of the ideas to which the intellect is capable of giving birth. Mr. Moore's isolation of the whole of ethics, his steadfast refusal to relate questions as to what ought to be to questions as to what things *are*, may be eminently useful toward a rational ordering of conduct within a strictly limited sphere. But in its simplicity and abstraction surely Mr. Moore's system cannot be held to represent the whole truth. We are conscious of what Professor James might call a certain 'thinness,' even a certain sterility, in these 'unrelated' ethics of the intellectualist.

The trouble for those of us who do not find satisfaction in Mr. Moore comes, I think, from this failure to relate two equally real portions of experience, our experience of the actual world and our beliefs about what ought to exist. And here Professor James may help us. For the realists of Mr. Moore's school it is positively immoral to hold that what we believe ought to exist, can in any way affect what now we believe to exist, and it is almost worse to hold that what we believe does exist can or ought to affect our beliefs as to what ought to exist. Professor James takes an entirely contrary position. That which we believe does exist, he would say, does most certainly help to determine that which we believe ought to exist, nor is there anything illogical

in this. My belief that I live in a society certainly helps to form my belief as to what my relations to that society ought to be. Again, the effect of our beliefs about what does exist on our beliefs as to what ought to exist is only limited by the reaction of this second class of beliefs upon the first. Ethics and metaphysics are for the pragmatist bound up in a series of actions and reactions apparently endless. For the pragmatist the discussion of what does exist is relevant to the discussion of what we think ought to exist, for the simple reason that an understanding of the first point may throw some light on the question why we so conceive the second. For pragmatists psychology is relevant to logic, and rightly, for the study of how men actually do think has in Professor James's own case clearly helped to determine in him a more definite belief as to how he, at least, ought to think. For the pragmatist as for the intellectualist the feeling implied in the proposition, "A is good," is unanalyzable, but the pragmatist, unlike the intellectualist, does not on that account dismiss the processes which have led to that feeling as irrelevant.

Practically, so far as we can analyze and trace these processes, we find in them the whole meaning of the proposition. A savage's belief in a certain kind of god inevitably determines part at least of his ethical beliefs. Convert him and he will probably change his ethical belief. It is of little use for the intellectualists to argue that our beliefs about the unseen ought not to affect our ethical beliefs; their own attempt so to banish metaphysics does most naturally affect their own ethical beliefs in that it tends to limit their ethical valuations to human and æsthetic relations. This is not to say that it is undesirable to limit the ethical point of view; for particular purposes it may be most desirable so to do. At the same time intellectualist ethics are most certainly influenced by this particular metaphysical belief in the non-existence of any relation between what may exist and what ought to exist.

Further, for the pragmatist his beliefs as to what ought to exist *do* naturally affect what he believes does exist, if only by being added to it as existing now and here. Intellectualists would admit as much. But it is surely irrational to deny that such beliefs may not seriously alter what shall exist in the future. Pragmatists are not content to remain inside the intellectualist camp of determinism. They prefer to regard their wills as no

less real facts of experience than are the facts of the earth and sky, and they actually are led to suppose that their will to believe certain things not obviously contradicted by the rest of their experience may actually help to determine the existence of those very things. The will to believe in fairies revived Tinker Bell, the will to believe in ourselves or our friends may obviously revive ourselves or them. If we believe in any god short always of the absolute, who can say that our will to believe in that god may not also affect him? Pragmatists have to banish the bogey of the 'pure intellect,' they have to assert the equal dominion of will with understanding, or rather, the unintelligibility of either term taken entirely apart. Finally since their appeal is always to the individual concrete experience, all their ethical valuations as all their truth valuations must be relative. Judgments as to what is good will be as relative for them as all others, and will only be held for true in so far as they find it more possible to live by them than by others. Consequently we cannot and do not expect Professor James to lay down the law as to what we ought to hold as particular ethical truths. In his pluralist universe which is like Plato's loathed democracy *ποικίλον καὶ παντοδαπόν* all claims may jostle each other, and have ultimately to fight the matter out. He can only show us that what is *does* affect what ought to be, and that if we will it strongly enough, what we hold ought to be may affect what is.

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THE ETERNAL VALUES. By Hugo Münsterberg. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1909. Pp. 436.

This work is, as the author tells us in the preface, not a mere translation of his German work, "Philosophie der Werte," although its scope and substance are the same. Much in the English version has been altered from the German work in the way of expansion and contraction. "Many side issues, especially such as connected the work with particular German movements are left out, and not a few additions refer to recent American discussion." Like the German work, "The Eternal